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Abstract
Recent developments have established the vulner-
ability of deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) to
policy manipulation attacks via adversarial pertur-
bations. In this paper, we investigate the robust-
ness and resilience of deep RL to training-time and
test-time attacks. Through experimental results,
we demonstrate that under noncontiguous training-
time attacks, Deep Q-Network (DQN) agents can
recover and adapt to the adversarial conditions by
reactively adjusting the policy. Our results also
show that policies learned under adversarial pertur-
bations are more robust to test-time attacks. Fur-
thermore, we compare the performance of ǫ-greedy
and parameter-space noise exploration methods in
terms of robustness and resilience against adversar-
ial perturbations.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, the field of deep Reinforcement
Learning (RL) has enjoyed rapidly growing attention and ad-
vancements. An important attraction of deep RL lies in ex-
ploiting the well-established feature learning capabilities of
deep neural networks in tandem with classical RL, thereby
enabling end-to-end policy learning through direct mappings
of raw observations to actions. This ability extends the
domain of classic RL applications to high-dimensional and
complex planning problems, leading to human-level and su-
perhuman performance various settings, ranging from learn-
ing to playing the game of Go [Silver and Hassabis, 2016]
and Atari games [Mnih et al., 2015] to robotic manipula-
tion [Gu et al., 2017] and autonomous navigation of aerial
[Zhang et al., 2016] and ground [Zhu et al., 2017] vehicles.
While the interest in adopting deep RL solutions is expand-
ing into more critical domains, such as intelligent transporta-
tion systems [Atallah, 2017], finance [Deng et al., 2017] and
national infrastructure [Mohammadi et al., 2017], state of the
art in understanding and ensuring the security and reliability
of such solutions remains at preliminary stages.
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Recently, Behzadan and Munir
[Behzadan and Munir, 2017] reported the vulnerabil-
ity of deep RL to both test-time and training-time
adversarial attacks exploiting adversarial examples
[Goodfellow et al., 2014]. While further investiga-
tions of this vulnerability (e.g., [Huang et al., 2017],
[Kos and Song, 2017]) verify the fragility of deep RL
agents to adversarial perturbations, only a few (e.g.,
[Lin et al., 2017]) focus on mitigation and countermeasures,
most of which are based on detection and mitigation of
test-time attacks.
In this work, we aim to further the research on security
of deep RL by investigating the resilience and robustness of
such algorithms to both training-time and test-time attacks.
In this context, resilience refers to the ability of an agent to
recover from adversarial attacks, and robustness is the abil-
ity of an agent to maintain desired functionality under adver-
sarial perturbations. Building on similar attack methodolo-
gies as those proposed in [Behzadan and Munir, 2017] and
[Kos and Song, 2017], we perform an experimental explo-
ration to study practical attack scenarios in which the attacker
perturbs training-time observations in a noncontiguous man-
ner - that is, instead of perturbing all observations, each ob-
served state is perturbed with a probability P (attack). In-
spired by the proposals of [Mandlekar et al., 2017], we exper-
imentally study the resilience of DQN agents training in Atari
2600 game environments under such attacks. We also inves-
tigate the robustness of policies trained under noncontiguous
attacks to test-time perturbations. Furthermore, we compara-
tively study the impact of exploration methods on resilience
and robustness of DQN agents. In particular, we focus on
the newly proposed parameter-space noise technique. Recent
proposals by OpenAI [Plappert et al., 2017] and DeepMind
[Fortunato et al., 2017] demonstrate that the addition of adap-
tive noise to the parameters of deep RL architectures may
enhance the exploration behavior and convergence speed of
such agents. Contrary to classical exploration heuristics such
as ǫ-greedy [Sutton and Barto, 1998], parameter-space noise
is iteratively and adaptively applied to the parameters of the
learning model, such as weights of the neural network. Con-
sidering the reported enhancements enabled by parameter-
space noise exploration, our experiments aim to compare the
performance of this technique and ǫ-greedy under adversarial
perturbations.
Accordingly, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
1. We demonstrate that Deep Q-Network (DQN) agents are
capable of recovering from noncontiguous training-time
attacks by adjusting their policies to account for adver-
sarial perturbations.
2. We demonstrate that the policies trained under adversar-
ial perturbations are more robust to test-time attacks.
3. We investigate the effect of exploration methods on re-
silience and robustness by comparing the performance
of ǫ− greedy and parameter-space noise techniques un-
der adversarial attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 reviews the relevant background on DQN, parameter-
space noise exploration via the NoisyNet approach, and ad-
versarial example attacks on deep RL. Section 3 describes the
training and test-time attack models considered in this work.
Section 4 details the experiment setup and presents the corre-
sponding results. Section 5 concludes the paper with remarks
on the obtained results and notes on potential venues of fur-
ther research.
2 Background
2.1 Q-Learning
The problem of RL -i.e. learning to act well through experien-
tial interactions with the environment, is often formally mod-
eled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Such processes
are described by the tupleMDP = (S,A, P,R), where S is
the set of reachable states in the process, A is the set of al-
lowed actions, P represents the transition probabilities (i.e.,
dynamics), and R is the mapping of transitions to the imme-
diate reward. At any given time step t, the environment is at
a state st ∈ S. The RL agent’s choice of action at time t,
at ∈ A triggers a transition from st to a state st+1 accord-
ing to the transition probability P atst,st+a . The agent receives
a reward rt = R(st, at) ∈ R, where R denotes the set of real
numbers, representing a scalar reward due to the transition
from state st to state st+1.
The mechanism for choosing actions at given states is cap-
tured in a policy π. When this mechanism is deterministic, the
policy π : S → A is a mapping between the states and their
corresponding desired actions. Similarly, a stochastic policy
is a probability distribution over actions that determines the
probability of taking each action at any state s. The core ob-
jective of RL is to learn the optimal policy π∗ that maximizes
the cumulative reward over time at time t, denoted by the re-
turn function Rˆt =
∑
∞
k=0 γ
krt+k, where γ ∈ [0, 1] is the
discount factor accounting for the diminishing worth of re-
wards obtained further in time, which also ensures that Rˆ is
bounded.
One approach to this problem is Q-learning, which aims to
estimate the value of taking each action in any state, defined
as the sum of future rewards when taking that action and fol-
lowing the optimal policy thereafter. Accordingly, the value
of an action a in a state s is given by the action-value function
Q defined as:
Q(s, a) = R(s, a) + γmaxa′(Q(s
′, a′)) (1)
Where s′ is the state that emerges as a result of action a,
and a′ is an allowed action for state s′. The optimal policy is
hence given by π∗(s) = argmaxaQ(s, a)
The Q-learning method estimates the optimal action poli-
cies by using the Bellman equation Qi+1(s, a) = E[R +
γmaxaQi] as the iterative update of a value iteration tech-
nique. Practical implementation of Q-learning is commonly
based on function approximation of the parametrized Q-
function Q(s, a; θ) ≈ Q∗(s, a). A common technique for
approximating the parametrized non-linear Q-function is to
train a neural network whose weights correspond to the pa-
rameter vector θ. Such neural networks, commonly referred
to as Q-networks, are trained with the goal of minimizing the
loss function:
Li(θi) = Es,a∼ρ(.)[(yi −Q(s, a, ; θi))
2] (2)
where yi = E[R + γmaxa′ Q(s
′, a′; θi−1)|s, a], and
ρ(s, a) is a probability distribution over states s and actions
a. This optimization problem is typically solved using com-
putationally efficient techniques such as Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) [Baird III and Moore, 1999].
2.2 Deep Q Networks
Classical Q-networks present a number of shortcomings in
the Q-learning process. First, the sequential processing of
consecutive observations breaks the iid (Independent and
Identically Distributed) requirement of training data as suc-
cessive samples are correlated. Furthermore, slight changes
to Q-values leads to rapid changes in the policy estimated by
Q-network, which leads to rapid oscillations inQ estimations.
Also, since the scale of rewards and Q values are unknown,
the gradients of Q-networks can become very large and the
rewards can become unbounded.
A deep Q network (DQN) [Mnih et al., 2015] is a multi-
layered Q-network designed to mitigate such disadvantages.
To overcome the issue of correlation between consecutive ob-
servations, DQN employs a technique named experience re-
play: Instead of training on successive observations, expe-
rience replay samples a random batch of previous observa-
tions stored in the replay memory to train on. As a result,
the correlation between successive training samples is broken
and the iid setting is re-established. In order to avoid oscil-
lations, DQN fixes the parameters of the optimization target
yi. These parameters are then updated at regular intervals by
adopting the current weights of the Q-network. The issue of
unbounded rewards is also solved in DQN by normalizing the
reward values to the range [−1,+1], thus preventingQ values
from becoming too large.
Mnih et al. [Mnih et al., 2015] demonstrate the application
of this new Q-network technique to end-to-end learning of Q
values in playing Atari games based on raw pixel values ob-
served in the game environment. To capture time-dependent
features such as movements, Mnih et al. stack 4 consecutive
frames of the game together as the input to the network. For
training the Q-network, a random batch is sampled from the
previous observation tuples (st, at, rt, st+1). In the original
proposal of Atari DQN, each observation is processed by 2
layers of convolutional neural networks to learn the features
of input frames, which are then employed by feed-forward
layers to approximate the Q-function. The target network Qˆ,
with parameters θ−, is synchronized with the parameters of
the original Q network at fixed intervals -i.e., at every ith it-
eration, θ−t = θt, and is kept fixed until the next synchroniza-
tion. The target value for optimization of DQN learning thus
becomes:
y′t ≡ rt+1 + γmaxa′Qˆ(St+1, a
′; θ−) (3)
Accordingly, the training objective can be stated as:
minat(y
′
t −Q(st, at, θ))
2 (4)
2.3 NoisyNets
Introduced by Fortunato et al. [Fortunato et al., 2017],
NoisyNet is a type of neural network whose biases and
weights are iteratively perturbed during training by a para-
metric function of the noise. Such a neural network can be
represented by y = fθ(x), parametrized by the vector of
noisy parameters θ = µ + Σ ∗ ǫ, where τ = (µ,Σ) is a
set of vectors representing learnable parameters, ǫ is a vector
of zero-mean noise with fixed statistics, and ∗ is element-
wise multiplication. Accordingly, [Fortunato et al., 2017]
proposes a modified DQN algorithm. This algorithm omits
ǫ-greedy, and instead optimizes the Q-function greedily. The
fully connected layers of the Q-function are parametrized as
a NoisyNet, whose parameters are drawn from the noisy net-
work parameter distribution after every replay step. The noise
distribution proposed for this architecture is factorized Gaus-
sian noise. At experience replay, current NoisyNet parame-
ter samples are held constant, while during the optimization
of each action step, these parameters are re-sampled. The
loss function in this variant of DQN is minimizing. The
parametrized action-value function Q(x, a, ǫ; τ) can be seen
as a random variable, and accounted for accordingly in the
optimization function. Further technical details of this archi-
tecture are available in [Fortunato et al., 2017], with a similar
proposal detailed in [Plappert et al., 2017].
2.4 Adversarial Examples
In [Szegedy et al., 2013], Szegedy et al. report that several
machine learning models, including deep neural networks,
are vulnerable to misclassify inputs that are only slightly dif-
ferent from correctly classified samples drawn from the data
distribution. Such inputs are known as adversarial examples.
Furthermore, it was shown that a wide variety of models with
different architectures trained on sampled subsets of the train-
ing data misclassify the same adversarial example.
This problem can be formalized as follows: consider a ma-
chine learning systemM and a benign input sample C which
is correctly classified by the machine learning system, i.e.
M(C) = ytrue. According to Szegedy [Szegedy et al., 2013]
and many proceeding studies [Papernot et al., 2016c], it is
possible to construct an adversarial example A = C + δ,
which is perceptually indistinguishable from C, but is classi-
fied incorrectly, i.e. M(A) 6= ytrue.
Adversarial examples are misclassified far more often than
examples that have been perturbed by random noise, even if
the magnitude of the noise is much larger than the magnitude
of the adversarial perturbation [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. Ac-
cording to the objective of adversaries, adversarial example
attacks are generally classified into the following two cat-
egories: misclassification (non-targeted) attacks, which aim
for generating examples that are classified incorrectly by the
target network, and targeted attacks, whose goal is to gener-
ate samples that the target misclassifies into an arbitrary class
designated by the attacker.
To generate such adversarial examples, several algorithms
have been proposed, such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) by Goodfellow et al., [Goodfellow et al., 2014]. A
limiting assumption in many of the crafting algorithms is
that the attacker has complete knowledge of the target neu-
ral network, including its architecture, weights, and other
hyperparameters. To overcome this constrain, Papernot et
al. [Papernot et al., 2016b] proposed a blackbox approach
to generating adversarial examples. This method exploits
the generalized nature of adversarial examples: An adver-
sarial example crafted for a neural network classifier ap-
plies to most other neural network classifiers that perform
the same classification task, regardless of their architecture
and hyperparameters. Accordingly, the approach proposed
in [Papernot et al., 2016b] is based on generating a replica of
the target model. The attacker creates and trains this model
over a dataset from a mixture of samples obtained by observ-
ing target’s response to test inputs, as well as synthetically
generated inputs and output pairs. Once trained, any of the
adversarial example crafting algorithms that require knowl-
edge of the target network can be applied to the replica. Due
to the transferability of adversarial examples, the perturbed
inputs generated for the replica model will induce misclassi-
fications in many of the other networks that perform the same
task.
2.5 Adversarial Example Attacks on Deep RL
Building on the fact that classification and estimation of Q-
network are both instances of function approximation, Be-
hzadan and Munir [Behzadan and Munir, 2017] propose that
adversarial examples also apply to policy learning in Deep
RL. Their paper demonstrates that adversarial examples can
manipulate the choice of actions at test-time, and disrupt the
policy learning process via continuous perturbation of ob-
servations at training-time. While most extensions of this
work focus on test-time attacks (e.g., [Huang et al., 2017],
[Lin et al., 2017]), Kos and Song [Kos and Song, 2017] build
on these results to show that training-time disruption of policy
can also be achieved with noncontiguous attacks: In practical
settings, it is unlikely for the adversary to successfully perturb
all observations. Therefore, [Kos and Song, 2017] investigate
the scenario in which each observation is perturbed with a
probability P (attack), and experimentally analyze various
heuristics for optimizing the impact of such attacks on pol-
icy disruption. In the following section, we adopt this idea to
develop our attack model and experimental settings.
3 Attack Model
We consider an attacker whose goal is to perturb the optimal-
ity of actions taken by a DQN agent at either the test-time
or training-time by perturbing the observations of the agent.
Aiming for the analysis of worst possible cases, we consider
whitebox attack scenarios, i.e., the adversary is assumed to
have complete knowledge of the target model’s architecture
and hyperparameters, as well as state observations. In this
attack model, the attacker has no direct influence on the tar-
get’s architecture and parameters, including its reward func-
tion, exploration rate, parameter noise, and the optimization
mechanism. The only parameter that the attacker can directly
manipulate is the configuration of the training environment
observed by the target. For instance, in the case of Atari
games [Mnih et al., 2015], the attacker may manipulate pixel
values of the game frames, but not the score. We assume that
the adversary acts as a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) between
its target and the environment, capable of manipulating the
state before it is observed by the target through either pre-
dicting future states, having a quicker action speed than the
target’s sampling rate, or inducing a delay between genera-
tion of the new environment and its observation by the target.
We also assume that the adversary perturbs each observation
of the targeted agent with the probability P (attack) ∈ [0, 1].
To avoid detection and minimize influence on the environ-
ment’s dynamics, we impose an extra constraint on the at-
tack such that the magnitude of perturbations applied to each
configuration must be smaller than a set value denoted by
ǫ. Also, we do not limit the attacker’s domain of perturba-
tions, e.g., the attacker may perturb any of the pixel values
in any frame of an Atari game environment. Perturbations
are crafted using the FGSM technique for non-targeted at-
tacks [Goodfellow et al., 2014], which aims to find an adver-
sarial perturbation that causes the target to output any action
other than the correct one. It is noteworthy that in this at-
tack model, the adversary does not require any knowledge of
the target’s reward function, environmental dynamics, or ex-
ploration techniques, and only needs to know the weights of
target’s Q-network at any given time-step.
In training-time attacks, the adversary manipulates target
DQN’s learning process by crafting states s′t = st + δst such
that maxa Qˆ(s
′
t, a; θ
−
t ) identifies an incorrect choice of opti-
mal action. If the attacker is capable of crafting adversarial
inputs s′t such that the value of equation 4 is minimized for
any action a′t 6= at, then the policy learned by DQN is skewed
towards suggesting a′ as the optimal action given the state s′t,
which at the feature learning level of DQN, can be indistin-
guishable from the unperturbed st if δst is sufficiently small.
For test-time attacks, a similar MITM attack model is
considered. To analyze the robustness of policies under
worst possible conditions, the adversary applies non-targeted
FGSM perturbations to all observations (P (attack) = 1).
4 Experimental Results
Following the classic benchmarks of DQN, our experimen-
tal environments consist of emulated Atari 2600 games.
We demonstrate the results for two game environments,
namely Breakout and Pong. To enable the comparison be-
tween ǫ-greedy and NoisyNet exploration techniques, we run
our training and test-time experiments on both implemen-
tations. The neural network configuration of both models,
as well as the ǫ-greedy algorithm follow that of the original
DQN proposal by Mnih et al. [Mnih et al., 2015], and the
NoisyNet implementation is based on the algorithm presented
in [Fortunato et al., 2017].
We implemented the experimentation platform in Ten-
sorFlow using OpenAI Gym [Brockman et al., 2016]
for emulating the game environment and Cleverhans
[Papernot et al., 2016a] for crafting the adversarial examples.
Our DQN implementation is a modified version of the
module in OpenAI Baselines [Dhariwal et al., 2017]. The
source-code for our platform is available at [Behzadan, 2017]
for open-source use in further research.
4.1 Training-time Attacks
In accordance to the attack model detailed in Section 3,
we investigate the performance of DQN with both ǫ-greedy
and NoisyNet exploration techniques under noncontiguous
attacks. Similar to the work in [Kos and Song, 2017], our
experiments initiate training-time attacks at or close to the
convergence of mean return towards the optimal value. Max-
imum perturbation threshold for FGSM is set to 0.004.
Figure 1 illustrates the results of noncontiguous attacks in
Breakout for varying values of p = P (attack). It can be
seen that in both NoisyNet and ǫ-greedy implementations,
for p = 0.2 and p = 0.4, agents recover from policy dis-
ruption and adjust their policies to overcome adversarial per-
turbations. Conversely, for p = 0.8 and p = 1.0 (contiguous
attack), both agents fail to recover from policy disruptions in
the span of our experiments.
Figure 2 depicts a similar behavior for the Pong environ-
ment in a wider span over iterations. Both sets of results
verify that if the attack probability is less than some thresh-
old, DQN agents are able to recover from training-time ad-
versarial attacks. An interesting observation is the existence
of phase transition points: in both Pong and Breakout and
with both exploration mechanisms, for p = 0.2 and p = 0.4,
the training performance deteriorates almost uniformly until
a minimum point is reached, from which onward the agent
begins to recover and adjust the policy towards optimal per-
formance. An intuitive interpretation of this behavior stems
from the statistics of experience replay: for the agent to re-
cover from adversarial perturbations, the number of interac-
tions with the perturbed environment must reach a critical
mass (i.e., minimum) so that the randomly sampled batches
from the experience buffer can represent the statistical signif-
icance of perturbations.
Furthermore, it can be seen that in both cases for p =
0.2 and p = 0.4, the minimum value of return (averaged
over most recent 100 episodes) reached by ǫ-greedy agents
is higher than that of NoisyNet agents, which may be at-
tributed to better robustness of ǫ-greedy over NoisyNet. Con-
versely, NoisyNet agents reach phase transition and recovery
in fewer iterations than their ǫ-greedy counterparts, which can
be evidence of superior resilience in NoisyNet over ǫ-greedy
agents.
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Figure 1: Breakout - training-time attacks (p = P (attack))
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Figure 2: Pong - training-time attacks (p = P (attack))
Figure 3 depicts the performance of policies trained un-
der adversarial perturbations at non-adversarial test-time con-
ditions. In concordance with [Behzadan and Munir, 2017]
and the training results, It can be seen for p = 0.8 and
p = 1.0, test-time performance in non-adversarial conditions
severely deteriorates. On the other hand, for p = 0.2 and
p = 0.4, policies trained under adversarial attacks perform
almost as well as the original policy in non-adversarial con-
ditions. This result verifies that adversarially trained policies
that recover from disruption retain their original performance
in non-adversarial conditions.
4.2 Test-time Attacks
As described in Section 3, we investigate test-time attacks
under the worst-case scenario of p = 1.0 (contiguous at-
tack). Accordingly,we measure the mean return of each agent
trained under adversarial perturbations with various values of
p when subjected to a contiguous FGSM attack with the same
perturbation threshold as that of training-time attacks. Fig-
ure 4 illustrates the results, demonstrating the strengthened
test-time robustness of adversarially trained policies relative
to unperturbed policies. Also, Comparing the mean returns
of ǫ-greedy and NoisyNet agents, it is observed that in all
cases ǫ-greedy performs better than NoisyNet under test-time
attacks. This suggests the superior test-time robustness of ǫ-
greedy exploration over NoisyNet. An immediate explana-
tion for this behavior may be the greater number of iterations
that ǫ-greedy agents take to reach the phase transition point,
as observed in Section 4.1. This allows the agent to sample
more interactions with the perturbed environment, and thus
learn a policy that overcomes a wider variety of perturbed
states compared to NoisyNet. Further verification and analy-
sis of this hypothesis remains a priority for future extensions.
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Figure 3: Test-time performance of adversarially trained policies in non-adversarial conditions (p = P (attack))
5 Conclusion
We reported an experimental study of resilience and robust-
ness in Deep Q-Network (DQN) agents under noncontiguous
adversarial perturbations. Investigation of training-time at-
tacks demonstrate that if the probability of perturbation for
each observation is less than a threshold, DQNs are able to re-
cover from deteriorating training performance and adjust the
policy to overcome adversarial perturbations. Correspond-
ing results show the existence of a phase transition point, at
which the semi-monotonic deterioration of policy ends and
recovery begins. Comparative analysis of our results sug-
gests that ǫ-greedy exploration is more robust to training-
time attacks, meaning that it resists the slope of deteriora-
tion better than NoisyNet and the corresponding policy expe-
riences less severe drops in performance. On the other hand,
NoisyNet may provide better resilience to such attacks by go-
ing through phase transition towards recovery in fewer num-
ber of iterations. We also demonstrate that recovered poli-
cies perform almost as well as the unperturbed policy in non-
adversarial test-time experiments. Furthermore, our investi-
gation of test-time attacks on adversarially trained policies
demonstrate that such policies are more robust to test-time
perturbations than unperturbed policies. The results also sug-
gest that ǫ-greedy exploration provides stronger test-time ro-
bustness than NoisyNet.
The experimental observations of this work present a num-
ber of promising venues for further research into characteris-
tics of secure deep RL systems. Analysis of the phase tran-
sition point and its relationship with attack probability may
provide new insights into the limits of reliable training and
facilitate secure design practices. Similarly, deeper investiga-
tion of exploration mechanisms and their effect on resilience
and robustness of deep RL can lead to the development of en-
hanced exploration techniques and design guidelines for re-
liable deep RL systems. We believe that research into such
venues is crucial for understanding and developing secure
RL, as well as emerging and future RL-based approaches to
artificial general intelligence.
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